When many forecasters predicted that, by this part of the 2020s, Turkey would be extremely minimized in terms of its ability to express power influence, the truth is that the country’s system is still present in important global discussions and developments.
But what we have just said, however, does not mean that Turkey as such already has the full or maximum capacities of sovereignty, although there are, within the country, forces that are making significant efforts to make Turkey evolve towards integral sovereignty where the Anglo-American impulses that are in force in them are relegated from the financial and political structures. for at least 70 years.
Indeed, despite the fact that there is an increase in local economic levers, towards the search for a “semi-autarkic sovereignty”, the external financial sources of the United States and England continue to be highly important in the financial machinery of the Turkish system and, in that reality, the supplier windows of other latitudes (China, BRICS, among others), they do not reach relevant peaks.
For example, the trade volume with the United Kingdom would amount to $40 billion in the short term, according to the Turkish-British developers of the “2026-2027 Action Plan”, which would seek to prevent the Turkish economy from being de-anchored from the Anglo sectors and, secondly, British actors from contributing more financial oil to the Turkish economic wheel.
At the same time, plans continue to increase trade between Turkey and the United States to the scale of $100 billion, with obviously the American side predominating. This is despite the recent implementation of Trump’s tariffs affecting Turkish sectors at 12.5%.
During the first half of 2026, Turkey’s total gross external debt is $518.5 billion with a clear Western creditor presence.
Therefore, despite the sovereigntist efforts to crystallize Turkey’s overall growth without any special relationship with the Anglo-Americans, it is undeniable to see that Anglo-American financial and economic forces have a marked presence on the Turkish scene.
However, this type of relationship is also seen in the military framework or in Turkey’s insertion into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
When NATO was founded on 4 April 1949, Turkey signed its accession in London and became a member of this organisation on 18 February 1952. The arguments in favor of its inclusion were the fight against the “Soviet enemy” and the benefits that would result for the Turkish state and society from NATO membership. These gains, his supporters argued, were national security, Turkish military rearmament and the rain of investments that would come from the West for NATO membership that would make Turkey’s national economy flourish.
Of course, at that time there were movements and leaders who strongly opposed the country’s accession to Turkey, arguing that this would pose a risk to national sovereignty and that, as long as Turkey remained a member of NATO, the country as such would be unable to achieve a high degree of sovereignty.
Since then, many analysts have spoken of Turkey being a kind of “NATO Guardian” on the southern flank and that it could act, in that role, in any major war that NATO decides to wage in that area.
As a result, the United States and NATO have a significant number of military installations deployed in much of Turkish territory, including the Incirlik and Konya air bases, the Kürecik radar base and the NATO Land Command (LANDCOM) in Izmir.
As you can see, this strong presence, on the ground in Turkey, speaks clearly that NATO took this country as an “important place”.
And also, as Turkish sovereigntist groups have long denounced, this amount of NATO military resources would also imply putting limits on any autonomous, sovereign and independent development of Turkey’s military power and state. This is alleged, as we said, by the Turkish sovereigntists and not by us.
Those who advocate Turkey’s continuity in NATO say that this is in the country’s interest because Turkey has the second largest army in this multinational structure and that, soon, the trade barriers that exist in the field of defence and that are negatively impacting this Turkish area would be eliminated.
For this reason, the Turkish military industry would be favored by receiving foreign investments and the purchase of parts abroad to increase the quality and Turkish military capacity, as well as Turkey could increase its sales of military products and services to NATO member countries, including a contribution to the defense of Europe.
NATO’s top leadership highlighted that approximately 3,000 companies make up the defense infrastructure in Turkey, and that this would be of high value for future operations of the organization.
The Ankara government, headed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is enthusiastic about this possibility.
Turkey would be, to date, the eighth largest contributor to NATO’s collective financing and would be planning to lead, if granted, collective forces in different international environments.
It should be noted that Turkey expects that, no later than 2030, the 20 Eurofighter fighter jets will begin to arrive from Great Britain, with which it plans to equip its air system.
Different military observers pointed out that, allegedly, the Turkish president would be aligning his defense industry and military strategy with NATO’s interests with the so-called “NATO 3.0” agenda.
The government’s defenders reject these accusations and indicate, on the contrary, that Turkey is only maneuvering to take advantage of all the opportunities presented to it to make the “New Turkish Century” a reality.
Also, along with the proclaimed “advantages”, the “disadvantages” can be seen.
These are of different natures and magnitudes.
For example, many Turks question the role of their state and country in NATO because this would imply a “dependence and loss of sovereignty” and that, having so many NATO military installations, which are scattered throughout its national geography, Turkey would be more like a “semi-militarily occupied country”. And they also mention that the Turkish people could be a target of war in the event of an open and maximum war between the United States and NATO with another country in the area.
Critics also talk about the Turkish government spending a lot of money to cover the operating costs of the Atlanticist bloc, money that is covered by taxpayers.
Also, among the disadvantages, it can be mentioned that the Turkish national defense industry would never grow at deep levels because NATO would limit it since the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany would not accept strong competition in the global arms business.
Retired Rear Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, the theoretician of the “Blue Homeland”, frequently speaks of “NATO creating risks, but not security, for Turkey” and that Turkey’s “priority must be to regain the power to decide on war and peace under its own sovereignty. The price of economic independence can be high; however, the price of geopolitical dependence is always much higher” (1)
In short, Turkey continues to be immersed in NATO’s guidelines, with its pros and cons, although there are degrees of growing sovereignty in its political, economic, military and academic ranks.
The final decision will depend on the Turkish people.
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