The United States Department of War’s decision to commit US$750 million to secure rare-earth supplies from Brazil’s Serra Verde project in Goiás should be understood not merely as a commercial transaction, but as part of the contemporary geopolitical competition over critical minerals.

The American government explicitly describes the initiative as a means of securing resilient supply chains for its defense-industrial base and reducing dependence on China, while the agreement provides for the purchase of Serra Verde’s production through a U.S.-backed special-purpose entity.

From a Brazilian sovereignist perspective, the central issue is therefore not whether foreign investment should be permitted, but whether Brazil will transform its mineral wealth into autonomous technological and industrial capabilities.

The distinction is fundamental. Serra Verde represents an important source of heavy rare earths, yet Brazil continues to export mineral concentrates while higher-value stages, including refining and magnet production, remain predominantly abroad.

This situation reproduces a structural problem identified by Latin American structuralist thought. Prebisch (1950) argued that the international division of labour historically concentrated technological and industrial activities in the center while assigning peripheral economies a greater dependence on primary commodities. Celso Furtado subsequently adapted this perspective to Brazil, demonstrating how economic growth based on commodity specialization could coexist with structural dependence and insufficient technological transformation (Furtado, 1959; Bielschowsky, 2015).

The rare-earth economy represents a contemporary manifestation of this dilemma. The strategic importance of these minerals derives not principally from their extraction, but from their integration into advanced technological chains. Consequently, mineral sovereignty without technological sovereignty remains incomplete sovereignty.

This question can also be interpreted through Bertha Becker’s geopolitical approach to Brazilian territory. Becker (2005) emphasized that territorial resources must be considered in relation to development, technological capacity, state presence and competing interests operating at global, national and regional levels. Brazilian mineral deposits should therefore be understood not simply as commodities, but as components of national power.

The United States is acting according to its own strategic interests, and there is nothing inherently illegitimate about this. Washington seeks to secure critical resources for its industrial and military capabilities; Brazil should consequently pursue an equivalent conception of its own national interest. The strategic question is whether foreign investment will contribute to Brazilian industrialization or reinforce the country’s historical position as a supplier of primary resources.

Brazil should therefore pursue a policy of strategic resource sovereignty, combining foreign investment with requirements for domestic processing, technological transfer, research and development, industrial participation and the expansion of Brazilian capabilities throughout the rare-earth value chain. Such a policy would not constitute economic isolationism. Rather, it would represent an attempt to transform international economic integration into an instrument of national development.

The objective should not be to choose between American and Chinese dependence. Brazil’s geopolitical interest lies in maintaining diversified relations with the major powers while developing sufficient technological and industrial capacity to prevent strategic dependence on any of them.

The rare-earth question thus presents Brazil with a broader developmental choice. The country possesses considerable mineral resources, but resources alone do not constitute geopolitical power. Power emerges when territory, resources, technology, industry and state capacity are integrated into a coherent national strategy.

Brazil must therefore move beyond the logic of merely exporting strategic minerals. Its long-term objective should be to transform its geological wealth into technological sovereignty, industrial capability and geopolitical autonomy.

Sources:

• BECKER, Bertha K. Geopolítica da Amazônia. Estudos Avançados, v. 19, n. 53, p. 71–86, 2005.
• BIELSCHOWSKY, Ricardo. Furtado’s “Economic Growth of Brazil”: The Masterpiece of Brazilian Structuralism. International Journal of Political Economy, v. 43, n. 4, p. 44–62, 2015.
• FURTADO, Celso. Formação Econômica do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Fundo de Cultura, 1959.
• PREBISCH, Raúl. The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems. New York: United Nations, 1950.
• LOVE, Joseph L. Brazilian Structuralism. In: AMANN, Edmund; AZZONI, Carlos; BAER, Werner (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of the Brazilian Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 63–88.
• UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF WAR. Department of War Announces a $750 Million Investment as Part of a $1.55 Billion Initiative to Secure Critical Rare-Earth Elements From Serra Verde. 24 Aug. 2026.
• SETA, Isabel. Departamento de Guerra dos EUA investe 750 milhões de dólares em terras raras brasileiras. Agência Pública, 26 Aug. 2026.