NATO decides to hibernate… why and… until when?

November 20, 2026

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has stepped on the brakes of its diplomatic machinery hard and abruptly and unexpectedly. A few days ago, after an uninterrupted decade of annual summits whose goal already seemed to be solely and solely to project an image of cohesion in the face of the evidence of lacking it, the Atlantic Alliance confirmed the cancellation of its meeting of heads of state and government scheduled for 2027 in Albania, while a severe cut in the schedule of its ministerial meetings.

Although its General Secretariat desperately tries to justify such a decision by presenting it as an administrative reform aimed at gaining “flexibility” and an economic one to save costs, it does not achieve this either among its members or among those who are not, since the reality is very different and evident: the decision responds to a last-minute strategy of damage containment.

After a long time operating under a forced appearance of political consensus that was becoming less sustainable every year, as well as under the pressure of its also forced and constant expansion, the increasingly deep fractures among its 32 members have become visible, as hiding them for any longer was already impossible. Thus, NATO has decided to take an indefinite period and begin a phase of diplomatic hibernation containing these fractures, which are also structural and increasingly endangered its internal cohesion, threatening such an old structure with collapse.

And indeed, for some time, and not for a short time, NATO was already unable to hide the asymmetry in the distribution of financial burdens fueled by the demand to raise military spending to 5% of GDP by 2035 and the divergence of geopolitical priorities between Washington and European capitals due to the wear and tear in all aspects of the war in Ukraine and, more recently, the sharp disagreements operational and political issues surrounding the war with Iran, which have acted as the final trigger, had turned every high-level meeting into a diplomatic battlefield among its members, whose seriousness  was increasing, threatening to  create a shameful public spectacle of total paralysis or direct clash with Donald Trump, especially since the already histrionic U.S. leader has emerged scorched from his midterms, so faced with their always unexpected reactions, Brussels has chosen to minimize the political exposure of its European leaders who, by the way, none of them are at their best.

The “reorganization package” and the end of summit diplomacy

The news broke during the European Political Community (EPC) summit held in Dublin on November 12, 2026. There, Albania’s Prime Minister, Edi Rama, openly acknowledged that “there is still no common position on when the summit will be held; certainly not in 2027.”

A few hours later, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte tried to downplay the announcement by stating that “We are flexible with NATO summits,” emphasizing to support what was said, although without achieving his goal, of course, that the organization convenes these meetings “when there is a need,” and recalling that, until about ten years ago, the usual cycle of allied summits was biennial and not annual.

Contrary to what Rutte suggested, the real scope of the measure shows that this is not an isolated adjustment in the presidential agenda, but a structural contraction of political deliberation within the Alliance, since the measure goes further by being accompanied by the suspension of Defense appointments, since NATO Defense Ministers, who traditionally meet every October in Brussels to coordinate capabilities and operational plans, in addition to having previously canceled their October 2026 session, have already done the same with the corresponding October 2027 session, and have also decided on a drastic cut to the agenda of Foreign Ministers who will meet only once throughout 2027, compared to the two semiannual meetings they had been holding regularly. 

NATO insists on calling this cut a “reorganization package,” citing, on the technical level, the enormous financial and logistical burden involved in these events; for example, organizing the Hague summit in June 2025 required a whole year of preparations and a disbursement close to 100 million dollars from the Netherlands. But all this is useless, since it is clear that economic savings are secondary compared to the political calculation that the real possibility of public confrontations with U.S. representatives implies, at least at this moment; some of which have already occurred, as the presence of U.S. Secretary of Defense Peter Heqseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio at previous ministerial meetings had been marked by great tension, with both absent key meetings or leaving the room before the sessions ended; furthermore, Hegseth had been using plenary sessions to directly and openly scold European partners and Canada for their, according to the U.S., lack of commitment.

Thus, with this “reorganization package,” the Alliance is trying to replace high-level preventive diplomacy with discreet management, aware that every plenary meeting risks becoming an intolerable spectacle. 

The budget battle: the 5% threshold and a two-speed Europe

In reality, and as could not be otherwise, the main trigger of internal discord is the distribution of the financial burden, that is, the budgetary fracture.

At the 2025 Hague summit, under intense pressure from Donald Trump, NATO approved an ambitious target, considered unattainable by many because it was unrealistic, of defense spending of up to 5% of GDP by 2035, a figure divided into two tranches: 3.5% allocated to military capabilities and basic defense, and an additional 1.5% focused on critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, and logistical mobility.

However, this bar has divided the organization into two blocs with fiscal capacities and opposing and irreconcilable political wills.

On one hand, the United States and the countries on the eastern flank (such as Poland and the Baltic republics) demand accelerated execution that only they are willing to do. On the other, several economies in Western and Southern Europe—whose spending is around 2.1%, such as Spain, Belgium, or Slovenia–, maintain much slower paces, warning that reaching that percentage would force them to cut their respective “welfare states” and/or soar public debt. 

The case of Albania illustrates to what extent this dispute conditions institutional decisions. Tirana was designated in 2025 as host of the 2027 summit, but in the final declaration of the Ankara summit (held on July 7 and 8, 2026), the mention of Albania as a future host disappeared because several allies opposed “rewarding” the Balkan country with the international visibility of a NATO summit, considering its budgetary effort insufficient, whose defense spending forecasts for 2026 were 2.15% of its GDP. Although Albania exceeds the former 2% target set in 2014, it falls far short of the new path toward 3.5% basic.

But Albania is by no means the only case, since as we have pointed out, countries like Spain (which remained around 2.1% and whose president, Pedro Sánchez, refused to commit to 5% in The Hague, earning the label of “problem” from  Trump), Belgium, and Slovenia record substantially lower levels of military investment. For the U.S. administration, bringing together the 32 leaders in 2027 without these countries presenting binding roadmaps toward 5% would only serve to highlight the breach of agreements, which for Brussels would mean risking a public disaster impossible to hide that must be avoided at all costs, even by slowing down summits, the lesser evil in this thorny case.

Ukraine, Iran, the wear of the transatlantic link 

The lack of harmony between the European approach—focused on supporting Kiev in the long term to curb an alleged Russian threat—and Washington’s policy—aimed at forcing negotiations and conditioning aid—weakens the principle of collective deterrence.

As the Ukraine conflict drags on with all kinds of serious consequences that are evident, the priorities of Washington and European capitals diverge radically day by day. While European countries—especially the Nordic, Baltic, and Eastern ones—consider Ukraine’s survival as a sovereign state and Russia’s strategic defeat existential issues for the continent’s security, the Trump Administration has increasingly conditioned the provision of military and financial aid on opening direct negotiations with the Kremlin, which it has currently achieved in Abu Dhabi, generating uncertainty about the real scope of future security guarantees for Kyiv. 

For Brussels, this lack of strategic harmony affects the very core of NATO’s deterrent function. One of the historic objectives of leaders’ summits has always been to project a monolithic image of military and political determination against supposed adversaries like Russia. In the current context, holding a summit without any agreement on long-term aid for Ukraine, nor on the potential fit in building European security, would reveal weakness and division not only before Moscow but also before important observers like Beijing, but also before Tehran, which Brussels believes they would not hesitate to exploit geopolitically in their favor.

The second fracture hotspot is located in the Middle East. After the joint attacks by the United States and Israel against Iran that began in February 2026 and the subsequent regional escalation, Washington expected strong political and operational support from its Atlantic partners; however, from the very beginning, not only did it not happen, but as events evolved clearly against the Israeli-American coalition, even European allies distanced themselves significantly, to the point of provoking the anger from the White House, with Donald Trump himself who, in the weeks leading up to the Ankara summit in July 2026, directly conveyed his deep “disappointment” to Mark Rutte, accusing NATO of “not having been there when the United States needed it”; in the case of the Spanish government, Trump’s invectives became very harsh, warning that it would have very serious consequences for Spain, which was realized at the end of that month with Washington’s backing of Morocco’s invasion, through almost 100,000 “immigrants” from Ceuta.

At that time, and to try to save  the Ankara summit at the last minute, Rutte had to deploy intense containment efforts, even revealing that the vast majority of European countries had indeed cooperated, albeit behind the scenes, since between 4,000 and 5,000 US aircraft had operated from European bases during the crisis with Tehran. Despite this, there is no doubt that the matter left an open and very deep wound; European partners argued that the Washington Treaty confines collective defense to the Euro-Atlantic area, which is true, but it is also true that these partners fundamentally feared that the crisis would drive energy prices up, creating an international crisis in such a sector of unpredictable proportions, as well as that the displacement of their increasingly scarce military reserves would dangerously weaken Ukrainian resistance, which could be exploited by Moscow.

To a lesser extent in European distrust towards Washington, but which should also be taken into account, is the ambition crowned by Trump’s success in taking geostrategic and security control of Greenland, an autonomous territory under Danish sovereignty, a founding member of NATO, whose government ultimately gave in to Trump, generating perplexity and astonishment among European NATO members who have begun to fear for their respective territorial integrities in case the US might one day return under such jurisdiction and covet, directly or through third parties, some part of them located extraterritorially such as, in the Spanish case, the Canary Islands, on which Morocco, the US’s preferred ally in Africa, already directly and openly pressures.

Conclusión

The decision to cancel the 2027 Albania summit and reduce ministerial meetings is fundamentally due to the equation: fewer summits, fewer clashes, fewer problems, more cohesion. 

Although the organization maintains its rapid response capacity intact and has mechanisms to call emergency meetings — in February 2022 it was held remotely after the start of the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine — its suspension reveals that the political consensus between the two sides of the Atlantic is going through a moment of particular gravity and delicacy,  since the “reorganization package” is a direct consequence of the impossibility of guaranteeing substantive agreements on 5% of spending, Ukraine and Iran, the three essential issues currently occupying NATO, so the Alliance has chosen to hibernate in order to avoid greater harm, buy time, calm tempers, reconcile currently opposed positions behind the scenes, and prevent fractures from seriously or even irreversibly breaking the transatlantic bond. 

Looking ahead, if the current situation, although not worsened nor improved, could lead to NATO’s evolution toward a tendency toward bilateral agreements among some of its members according to their interests and areas of influence — such as Nordic-Baltic formats or bilateral agreements between France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Poland — with shared spending in such cases.

Likewise, and only if there were a reduction in the U.S. military presence due to its involvement in other extra-Atlantic theaters of operations, could the ever-present Europeanization of European defense — although still utopian today — be promoted, replacing its decisions at NATO headquarters with others made in European capitals as its industrial and financial capacity increased.

Finally, there is no doubt that what is happening now gives wings both to the anti-Atlanticist European sectors, whose strength with identity parties is increasingly evident, and to the revisionists who have been questioning NATO’s validity in peripheral or hybrid scenarios, especially because the latest is already a reality and possibly even the future.

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