On February 5, the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment was signed between the administrations of Donald Trump and Javier Milei, representing the United States and the Argentine Republic respectively.

This agreement came after more than twelve months of talks and drafting documents, through which the United States added more demands to have a greater benefit in practice.

For Trumpist interests, this agreement means subordinating Argentine trade, industry, medical services and technology for the benefit of the US agenda since traditional US economic assets can enter without limitations or local Argentine obstructions, the strategic asset such as lithium is close to US ownership and usufructuation (integrating it into the chain of “Uncle Sam”). 

U.S. pharmaceutical and health products can enter without any Argentine barrier (it is enough to be approved by the FDA), the same mechanism will be given, according to the agreement, with the agri-food area where the authorizations of U.S. agencies are sufficient for the entry into Argentina of agri-food products of U.S. origin.

Likewise, U.S. machinery and automobiles have free rein without a local barrier to be placed in the Argentine domestic market in competition with those produced by Argentina. Washington will have de facto veto power over certain subsidies that the Argentine state implements on some of its local industries. Specifically, “Uncle Sam” will determine which industrial sector should be relegated or sabotaged.

In digital trade, Milei’s government decides not to sovereignly interfere in the flow of personal data to U.S. technology matrices.

Reference is also made to the coverage by the Argentine Republic of environmental costs.

Thus, in more than 70% of the pages of the agreement, the vision and interests of the United States are prioritized and privileged, in fact, over the focus and the national common good.

There is even a legal asymmetry because the courts of the United States predominate to arbitrate or monitor compliance with all the terms of the agreement.

And, in one of its basic points, it is expected that this agreement, which must be endorsed by the Congress of the Argentine Republic, will continue as it is with another government different from Milei’s current one for more than 10 years since its implementation.

Argentina’s concessions are very evident because, in addition to all of the above, even local aluminum will continue to have tariffs in the U.S. market, even though low or zero tariffs have been promised on products such as Argentine wine and beef, among others.

On what will be the tariff regime imposed on Argentina, it will soon be readjusted in some of its parts due to the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States in relation to Trump’s tariff program within the framework of the economic emergency powers signed by the head of the Oval Office.

The contractual framework is more binding on Argentina than on the United States because it gives the impression that it was drafted, in its final version, mostly by the U.S. technical teams where the Argentine technocrats only signed where they should have signed.

Of course, this is not accidental nor would it be a surprise because the government of Javier Milei had already announced that it would fully align itself with the United States and that emerging and multipolar blocs such as the BRICS will be dismissed.

Of course, this is not accidental nor would it be a surprise because the government of Javier Milei had already announced that it would fully align itself with the United States and that emerging and multipolar blocs such as the BRICS will be dismissed.

Without a doubt, few agreements Trump had with so many concessions from the other side. But it will be seen what will be implemented, to what extent and in how much time.

Clearly, Trump imposes his reindustrializing and neo-protectionist policy at the expense of Argentina where Javier Milei lacks conceptual and operational sovereignty.