In Argentina, the political system is considered hyper-presidential, since the powers vested in the president give him a much greater power or margin of action than those that a president has in other countries. However, politics far exceeds the institutional spheres, so it is possible to continue in some formal position and the loss of power becomes effective.

The latter is the case that Argentine President Javier Milei has been suffering throughout 2025, until he reached a state of affairs that became impossible to overcome. Between the bad economic and political decisions that he has been executing since the beginning of his term and the corruption scandals that gave birth since the beginning of this year, they generated a loss of power to the limit of what a system that protects the figure of its president to the maximum can endure.

The Argentine president, who in his first months in office being in a state of constant excitement, insulted politicians, journalists or economists who did not share his actions, now furiously seeks their support, simply to stretch the agony, unable to die with his boots on.

The crudest example of this is the painful image that his main candidate in the next legislative elections, Jose Luis Espert, showed throughout the week that he spent for the discovery of his links with a drug trafficker. A candidate who went from showing himself as a Robocop of politics to crying on a radio program to give pity, and then renouncing his candidacy.

As we said at the beginning, the institutional sphere runs on one side and politics on the other. On this level, when someone loses power immediately, another capitalizes on it, it is the famous constant zero-sum game that put the “libertarian” president in checkmate, and that it is only a matter of time before this situation is institutionalized.

To understand the current state of affairs, it is necessary to internalize the dynamics of Argentine politics. Today there are three large political groups, each with its own game, its power and its strategies. On the one hand the government, on the other hand a group of governors from five Argentine provinces (Córdoba, Santa Fe, Jujuy, Chubut and Santa Cruz) who formed an independent force and on the third place is the more or less unified Peronism.

With the rapid decline of the government, the chances of a future Peronist government increase, as was demonstrated in the legislative elections in the province of Buenos Aires. At the same time, there is a tension between those who lead the Peronist space, who know that the government cooks over time and comes to the point of being devoured in the 2027 presidential elections, and the militants-voters of this space, who suffer daily from Milei’s economic policies and want it to end as soon as possible.

A position against the political strength of the five governors who need an urgent fall of the Milei government, knowing that time is in favor of the Peronism, but which has electoral bases – militant more inclined to wait for the institutional times and reach the 2027 elections.

The result of these contradictions is a great pantomime, where the president is extorted to resign, disseminating audios of his sister’s political meetings, testimonies with accusations of corruption and the dissemination of documents from the president’s close circle with drug traffickers.

Where resignation is what is sought, since an impeachment trial would immediately place him in the role of victim, and he would not be able to fulfill the next role that falls to him as a scapegoat during the government that precedes him. A paradox disguised by the science of political communication where those who want the fall disguise themselves as respectful of the times and those who want this to last until the end disguise themselves as ultra-opponents.

The fragility of the government is so great that it seeks a rescue from the hand of an external actor such as the United States, however this compromises Argentina’s position in the dispute between China and the US, shipwrecked between the clutches of both.

Between the economic interdependence with China, mainly due to the interests of the sectors exporting vernacular raw materials, together with the import of Chinese products necessary to keep inflation somewhat low, despite the destruction of Argentine jobs; and the interests of the Americans who insist that Argentina be the spearhead of the containment of the Asian country in South America, but that so far the Milei government, despite the pro-American rhetoric, refuses to carry out.

Milei’s end is already a fact, it remains to be debated who will be the executioner and the conditions of the surrender. Meanwhile, its path is worse than scorched earth, with loss of purchasing power of wages, destruction of thousands of small, medium and large companies, seriously affecting jobs and national capital. As the days go by, the situation worsens and the bill is just around the corner.