Brief Background
In 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that “technological innovation has become the main battlefield.” Is the battle solely about trade or will it extend to other areas?
The war for technological dominance is closely linked to that of global dominance. Whoever controls new technologies and their multiple applications the most and best, especially in the fields of information, security, and defense, will dominate the others. The United States has been immersed in this war for decades, realizing it has lost much of the leadership it had held in this field, as in others, since the end of World War II. The other contender is China, and the fight is a fight to the death, as both know that everything is at stake; especially when China shows signs of being on the verge of surpassing the United States in strategic areas that could make it the leading power in defense, robotics, and artificial intelligence in the near future.
China’s technological development has been spectacular. Its main pillars have been the ambitious “Made in China 2025” plan, launched in 2015, designed to transform China into a powerhouse in advanced technologies by reducing its dependence on third parties—especially the United States—and the “Digital Silk Road,” a program that links infrastructure investments in China with the massive export of its technology to other countries.
Thus, today, China has overtaken the US in 37 of the 44 most important strategic technologies in sectors such as space, energy, and quantum computing, which will determine the coming decades.
It is on its way to becoming the dominant technological superpower due to its surprising advantage in most emerging disciplines. It has consolidated its leadership in particularly sensitive areas such as the development of hypersonic military technology; it is home to seven of the world’s ten most advanced research institutes in this field.
Of course, the US has known all of this for some time. In 2022, its Department of Defense already warned in its annual report on Chinese military and security developments. To counter this situation, that same year the US passed the “CHIPS and Science Act”—providing $52.7 billion initially—for research, development, production, and job training in the semiconductor sector. However, it included a wide range of prohibitions, restrictions, and preventions on the export of chips, equipment for their production, technology for their design, etc., to China, as well as restrictions on US citizens working in the Chinese technology sector! The “flight” of these citizens to China for better conditions and wages has been one of the greatest levers used by Beijing to boost its technological development.
Likewise, starting in 2023, the US is intensifying this stance by tightening controls, closing perceived loopholes in export restrictions, adding more licensing requirements, and subjecting more Chinese companies to trade restrictions, promoting a policy that China describes as a “technological blockade.”
For the US, the epicenter of this war is the giant Huawei, linked to the Chinese government, whose development has also been spectacular: in 2001, it had offices in 45 countries, including the US; by 2012, it had surpassed Ericsson and Nokia as the world’s largest provider of information and communications technology infrastructure; by 2019, it had a 27.5% share of the global market for 5G base stations, and by 2020, it surpassed Ericsson as the world’s leading supplier of such stations.
American reluctance toward Huawei began in 2007 following Huawei and Bain Capital’s investment in 3Com Corporation, a North American digital electronics company that provided cybersecurity systems to the US armed forces. This led to an investigation by the US Committee on Foreign Investment and, in 2012, another by the US House of Representatives, which concluded that “the United States should view with suspicion the continued penetration of the US telecommunications market by Chinese telecommunications companies.”
This report had a major impact worldwide, especially in Europe. From that moment on, the US attempted to export its hatred toward Huawei to its partners and allies in its efforts to globalize this war.
In 2020, high-ranking US dignitaries made several statements, including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who stated that “we are warning our allies and partners about the enormous security and privacy risks associated with allowing Huawei to build 5G networks in their countries.”
This was even reflected in the creation of a list of “Clean 5G Countries,” that is, those “that are choosing to allow only trusted vendors on their 5G networks instead of Huawei,” and another of “Clean 5G Telecommunications Companies,” which “are refusing to do business with tools of the Chinese Communist Party’s surveillance state, like Huawei.”
Furthermore, the US imposed harsh sanctions on Huawei—and 150 other Chinese companies—that virtually cut off its access to critical dual-use items it needed to import from the US.
For its part, the European Union, naturally subservient to the unipolar globalist directives of the United States, approved in 2023 the so-called “5G Cybersecurity Toolbox,” which imposes a total restriction on the use of Huawei and ZTE 5G technologies throughout Europe: “The security of 5G networks is essential.
They are critical infrastructures in their own right and for other sectors that depend on them, such as energy, transport, healthcare, and finance” (Thierry Breton, EU Internal Market Commissioner).
However, this legislation has not achieved the expected results due to the reluctance and deliberate delays of member countries in implementing it.
Although this was a severe blow to Huawei, which suffered considerable losses in revenue at the time, to the dismay of Washington and Brussels, the following year, 2023, the Chinese giant managed to overcome the crisis by getting 81 countries to use its equipment to build part of their 5G infrastructure: 18 of them European, including 10 NATO members (Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey); 28 in Asia, including three that have agreements with the US (the Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea); and also major markets such as Brazil and Russia.
Currently, collaboration with Huawei varies among US allies: in Turkey and Hungary, it will build the entire 5G network; in Germany, it already provides more than half of such infrastructure; in Italy, Portugal, Iceland, Spain, and the Netherlands as well; in Asia, telecommunications companies in the Philippines widely use Huawei equipment; in Thailand, Huawei has been operating its 5G network continuously since 2019; and even in South Korea, where the 5G infrastructure market is dominated by Samsung, the smallest operator, LG U+, uses Huawei equipment for its 5G network.
The counterpoint, that is, the countries that follow the US example by completely banning Huawei equipment, are Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia (members, along with the US and New Zealand, of the “Five Eyes” intelligence alliance), Japan, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, and Sweden.
Preliminary Reflections
What we have described, and we must take this into account, is evidence of the technological war Xi Ping spoke of—there are many other examples—; that those waging it are primarily the US and China; that China could be winning; that the main battlefield is trade, but, of course, that it has implications for security and defense.
That information is power is an old aphorism that remains and will remain valid. That information is linked to communications is unquestionable. That technology is the basis of communications, and therefore of information as well. We can glimpse that in a hyper-technological world, whoever dominates this sector will dominate the future. Thus, the ongoing technological war transcends mere commercial rivalry, although there is no doubt that it is one of its main battlefields, projecting itself into the realm of global power dynamics of the 21st century and beyond.
Today, any country’s technological capability is almost more of a measure of its strength than the power of its armed forces, as current and future technological advances are essential to them, and they are increasingly dependent on them and therefore closely linked to each other. Of course, technological capability is also fundamental to the economic stability, strategic autonomy, sovereignty, independence, and integrity of any nation.
Thus, protecting and securing a nation’s future in a global landscape undergoing profound and accelerated change from a unipolar to a multipolar one depends on its technological capability. Securing it, making it impenetrable, and protecting it from aggression or interference from third parties—not only from potential enemies and adversaries, but also, and this is important, from suppliers, whether “partners and allies” or others—is vital. Hence, the war we have described is not only limited to the commercial sphere, although that is the main factor, and to data and knowledge of all kinds, but also impacts defense and security, especially when the necessary technology, because it is not available, must be acquired from others.
So? There are only two ways to protect yourself: either develop the most advanced technology possible yourself or acquire it from others, ensuring, in this case, its impenetrability. What’s going on?
Countries that depend almost entirely on third-party technology, whether from their “partners and allies” or others, show significant vulnerabilities in this sector, which are difficult to remedy due to their manifest and insurmountable capacity to develop their own technology at the required levels, especially at this point.
Due to this weakness, for decades they have been incorporating foreign technology, usually from their “partners and allies,” into the functioning of not only civilian institutions but also military ones. However, this has evolved toward that of other countries, such as China—and also Israel—due to its proven greater effectiveness and better prices; which is logical and normal.
In the case of civil institutions, many of them vital to the life of every nation—social security and other related institutions are always the largest database of personal data for any administration—transport control and distribution networks—air, rail, road—whose importance goes without saying, nor do we even need to mention communications operators—telephony, internet, satellites, etc.—have been using Huawei devices and software for some time. For example, in Spain, Huawei is currently operating in the Ministry of the Interior’s Telecommunications Interception System (SITEL), that is, in judicial wiretapping of communications of all kinds.
The key question and its answer
Does the acquisition and use of Chinese technology, and specifically Huawei’s, pose, as the US i have us believe, a real danger to the security and defense of whoever acquires it, or is it a self-serving unipolar fiction?
On the one hand, it may be, because when used in such important sectors as those we have pointed out—and if this trend continues, it will be used in even more sensitive ones—there is no doubt that it puts in their hands the possibility of accessing a lot of vitally important information if said technology were “infiltrated,” that is, if it originally contained elements surreptitiously inserted into it for Beijing’s benefit whenever it deems fit.
On the other hand, there’s no reason for it to be so, but only if the person acquiring it is able to ensure that the technology doesn’t reach them “infiltrated.”
To achieve this, it’s enough for the recipient country to possess and develop organizations that can ensure that such “infiltration” doesn’t occur.
But, in the interest of objectivity, the same should apply to technology acquired from “partners and allies” whose interests, as has been proven and is normal, do not always coincide. In 1985, two CIA agents, i.e., “partners and allies,” were expelled from Spain after being caught red-handed intercepting communications from the Moncloa, i.e., the Prime Minister’s Office itself. Not to mention technology acquired from Israel, such as the Pegasus communications interception software used by an increasing number of countries.
The point is that we mustn’t fool ourselves, but rather assume that dependence on third parties in this fundamental matter is insurmountable, and that the technology of “partners and allies” will likely not be sufficient to meet our needs, especially if China ultimately wins the technological war—even if not absolutely.
In our view, and given this reality, what we should be doing now is:
- Centralize and strengthen the resources and missions of the oversight bodies for all technology acquired from third parties that could in any way affect security and defense, but also civilian areas of special importance to the regular and normal life of the nation, in order to ensure that it is not “infiltrated” and that its use and maintenance, including any updates, are entirely in our hands.
- The above, if you will, especially regarding Chinese acquisitions and specifically Huawei, imposing greater controls on its software, but never banning them as the US wants, a country on which we would then become even more dependent, and on which we must not forget that it is engaged in a technological war, primarily a commercial one with China, and from which, given its advances and prices, it is illusory to pretend that we can deprive ourselves of its technology, as many of the US’s “partners and allies” do not either.
- Likewise, and this is important, the same must be done with technology from “partners and allies,” because we must not be blind to the fact that in international relations, interests prevail over supposed or declared friendships and alliances. d) We must also properly consider the origin and veracity of the accusations against Huawei and Chinese technology in general, given that in this technological war, the commercial aspect is one of the main battlefields. This is because everything is driven by the US’s interest in expelling China from markets it considers its own, where the Chinese have been occupying, through advances and prices, large spaces, threatening to expel the US from them in turn. Proof of what we say is that the US has threatened to expel Spain from confidential information networks if it does not completely prohibit and refrain from acquiring Huawei technology, which, in addition to being a gross and intolerable interference in Spanish internal affairs, is manifestly discriminatory, since the US does not do the same with those NATO countries that use technology from the Chinese giant, nor with other Asian countries with bilateral agreements with it.
Finally, disliking the type of regime in China—by the way, can you imagine China, with 1.5 billion inhabitants, with a liberal party democracy?—is no reason, as in any other country, to avoid trading with it or depriving ourselves of its advances, as long as, we repeat, we take the necessary security measures.
Until we see China’s technological defeat, there’s nothing else we can do. But even if that happens, if it happens, our security in this area will still depend on our ability to ensure the impenetrability of the technology we acquire from both “partners and allies” and other countries, for example, Israel, right?
