In the international context, the world is moving away from US unipolarism in favor of a multipolar system. Sovereignty, defined as the ability of a state to exercise power over its territory without intervention from other nations, is now being debated due to the coexistence of “old” centers of power (China, Russia, the EU, India, among others). Within this movement, Latin America is emerging from centuries of “insignificance” to gain new room for maneuver. The ‘relative’ decline in US influence is creating a “window of opportunity” for greater regional autonomy, provided that countries can combine certain interests. In practice, this requires working on several links at once.
Recent reports highlight that China is offering itself to Latin America as a reliable “long-term” partner, while the US’s aggressive tariff policies have driven several countries towards Beijing. Several commentators from other continents have noted that the US government considers Latin America “a problem” and China sees it as “an opportunity.” With all this, the old policy of US influence through sanctions, military bases, and unilateral pressure is losing strength.
Unipolarity, the dominant model after the Cold War, is now being challenged by a more visible “polycentrism.” The question is how Latin America can strategically position itself in this new “post-Western world,” where alienation from a superpower is no longer considered a necessity. US influence, as a thalassocracy, a global maritime power, and one of the world’s largest commercial, military, and cultural ecosystems, is beginning to be questioned. The arrival of China and its South-South logic of cooperation has allowed several countries in the region to reconfigure their alliances and, for the first time, attempt to reduce their historical dependence on Washington.
China has not presented itself as a foreign empire or an ideological force; on the contrary, it has followed a pragmatic strategy, increasing investment in trade, such as in the areas of logistics and energy. Many Latin American countries seem to view these relationships as a “win-win” in opposition to Trump’s policy of sanctions, conditions, and tariffs. In latitudes where US hegemony is increasingly questioned, Latin America has real opportunities to take advantage of to reconfigure its international relations under a multipolar logic, establishing ties with various centers of power without having to submit to one.
The new global context has revived the debate on Ibero-America and its question of strategic autonomy relative to the United States. Progressive governments such as Brazil, Mexico in its current situation, Bolivia, and Nicaragua have supported greater diversification of partners, as well as the strengthening of regional mechanisms such as CELAC, UNASUR, and ALBA, with the aim of achieving greater economic and political self-government for the region. A clear example is that at the 2025 CELAC Summit, Lula and Xiomara Castro, along with other leaders, argued in favor of policies of less dependence on the US (tariffs, dollar) and greater Latin American integration. It is clear that the region’s “anti-Yankee” sentiment, stimulated by “Trumpism,” is causing some countries to adopt a more defensive stance. However, internal political fragmentation in the region is paralyzing this autonomous momentum. Alignment with the US tends to follow the traditional left-right divide: left-wing or moderate center-right governments tend to negotiate more freely, while populist right-wingers (Milei in Argentina, Bukele in El Salvador, Noboa in Ecuador, etc.) become staunch Trumpists and allies of Washington. This internal division limits Ibero-America’s strength to design a joint strategy for autonomy.
As for polarization in the United States (Trump supporters vs. Democrats), uncertainty in foreign relations is increasing for now. Faction fighting has made US foreign policy volatile and unpredictable: since Trump took office, there has been a marked decline in the US government’s ability and willingness to credibly project and politically predict international relations in the Americas. This, in turn, is prompting many Latin American governments to diversify their foreign policy or negotiate bilaterally with each administration. During his first term, Trump treated the region as a “testing ground” for a unilaterally imposed agenda (migration, trade, and security) through strong pressure and sanctions. That aggressive stance has reinforced the perception of the US as a power that punishes rather than cooperates. As a result, some countries are responding by seeking alternative alliances, for example with China or the EU, or by strengthening regional integration.
In this way, US ideological and political conflict is indirectly contributing to increased Ibero-American sovereignty during the latter half of the decade. The ongoing internal struggle makes it difficult for Washington to impose a uniform model or narrative externally. The more the unipolar role of US thalassocracy weakens, the more space Latin American states gain to pursue their own independent agendas. No country publicly acknowledges this global struggle, but its impact is evident in that Latin America no longer ‘wants or can choose between the US and China.’”
Following these trends, most analysts agree that the effective sovereignty of Ibero-American states will increase by 2030. The region now has new diplomatic options due to emerging multipolarity and the unpredictability of the United States. However, that momentum will depend on the ability of Latin American countries to coordinate; without a common strategy, the region is likely to remain divided between pro-Trump allies and anti-Washington critics. Ultimately, although strong interdependencies persist, it appears that Ibero-America will seek greater strategic autonomy during the second half of the decade, influenced in part by US domestic politics and the new global order.
Indicators suggest that Ibero-American sovereignty could increase in the coming years. The relative weakening of US unipolarity and the ongoing struggle between Trumpists and Democrats are prompting Latin American nations to improve their decision-making capabilities and diversify their international ties. However, this trend will depend on internal factors (regional cohesion, leadership) as well as the evolution of polarization in Washington: in any case, the multipolar landscape coupled with political struggles in the US seems more likely to strengthen Latin American self-determination than to limit it.
