Friedrich Merz’s visit to Ankara on October 30 exposed the rhetorical short-circuit between the German chancellor and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan over Gaza, but also the manifest desire not to break bridges. While the Turkish president reproached Germany for “not seeing” the “genocide” in the Strip, Merz reiterated historical support for Israel and at the same time advocated deepening the strategic relationship with Turkey.
This double movement – dissent in Gaza, but strategic rapprochement – defines the current phase of German foreign policy: containment of the political dispute so as not to sacrifice shared interests in the economy, migration, defence and transport. Merz has used the Turkish integration card into the EU to defuse tensions, declaring that “Germany wants to see Turkey in Europe” and that it will therefore promote dialogue based on the Copenhagen criteria, a process that – let us remember – has been blocked since 2018.
Germany is home to one of the largest communities of Turkish origin in Europe, it is estimated between 2.7 and 3.5 million people counting residents, nationalized and descendants according to different estimates, this certainly does not go unnoticed by Germany where it knows that Erdogan has an increasing weight within the German country, so there could be some kind of weight in cultural and social matters that helps to support the Turkish theses.
However, it is necessary to understand that more than rivals, Germany and Turkey are complementary on the European energy map. Ankara has established itself as a Caspian gas corridor to the EU (TANAP/TAP) and is exploring new flows – including Turkmen gas via Iran – while Berlin diversifies supplies and plans green hydrogen chains in which Turkey appears as a potential producer and logistics node.
The Merz administration, aware of this dependence, has benefited Turkey in the field of defence, recently supporting the idea of unblocking the sale of Eurofighter aircraft. This economic and strategic interdependence, benefiting from geography and historical contacts, suggests a pragmatic cooperation where Turkey gains weight and importance in the face of German foreign policy.
Despite the above, and German efforts to try to ease tensions, it is relevant to mention that Turkey maintains a firm stance against Israel, to the point that it blocked all commercial relations, as well as air and sea space with the Hebrew country, which puts Germany in a complicated situation due to the hostility between its partners.
Erdoğan has on numerous occasions called for the recognition of a Palestinian state, not only addressing the international community in general, but also expressly Germany, a country to which he expressly conveyed the need to recognize Palestine as an independent and geographically integrated state within the borders recognized in 1967 by the United Nations.
Understanding the picture a little better now, we understand that the Merz-Erdoğan relationship oscillates between cooperation out of necessity and a blatant disagreement on foreign policy. The rhetorical short-circuit through Gaza will not, by itself, prevent the advancement of an agenda of strengthening and cooperation in immigration, customs, transport, defence and energy given the interdependence of both actors, however, will German support to integrate Turkey into the European Union finally materialise?
It will be necessary to continue to pay attention to the events between the two States to closely observe how these aspects evolve, which go beyond a mere bilateral relationship, but through which important transnational consequences may arise.
