Until a few years ago, nuclear disarmament was a consensus and considered a goal of virtually the entire ‘international community.’ That is no longer the case. In recent years, Brazil has been the scene of a discreet debate on nuclear weapons, driven by global geopolitical tensions and internal questions about sovereignty and defence.
Events such as the conflicts in the Middle East, Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, and the United States’ military action in Venezuela have reignited discussions that seemed dormant since the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1998. Politicians, military officials, and geopolitical analysts question whether the country, which possesses advanced nuclear technology and is developing nuclear-powered submarines, should keep the door open to deterrent capabilities, even though the 1988 Federal Constitution stipulates that all nuclear activity must be exclusively for peaceful purposes.
Historically, Brazil has built a reputation as a pacifist nation. In addition to the NPT, it is a signatory to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which establishes Latin America as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Nevertheless, Brazil did develop a Parallel Nuclear Programme, coordinated with Argentina and in partnership with Iraq and the Federal Republic of Germany. The objective of this programme was complete mastery of the nuclear cycle, including for military purposes. After the fall of the military dictatorship, however, and Brazil’s accession to the Washington Consensus, the Brazilian government destroyed its own military nuclear programme.
Today, the national nuclear programme, with expertise in uranium enrichment and the Submarine Project (Prosub), focuses on civil energy and conventional naval propulsion. However, nationalist voices argue that, in a multipolar world, the absence of a nuclear arsenal makes the country vulnerable to arms powers. Proposals such as the PEC (Constitutional Amendment Proposal) by Deputy Kim Kataguiri, which aimed to authorise weapons for ‘deterrence’, and statements by the Minister of Mines and Energy, Alexandre Silveira, on possible ‘nuclear defence’, fuelled the debate.
The high point came on 10 December 2025, when the Chamber of Deputies’ Foreign Affairs and National Defence Committee (CREDN) rejected the ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPAN), signed by Brazil in 2017. Unlike the NPT — which recognises the five nuclear powers of the time and focuses on non-proliferation — the TPAN requires the total and immediate elimination of all nuclear arsenals. The rapporteur, Deputy Luiz Philippe de Orleans e Bragança, presented an opinion for rejection, which was approved in a symbolic vote without debate.
According to the rapporteur, the TPAN imposes unilateral restrictions on Brazil’s defensive and deterrent capabilities, especially nuclear, while none of the nine states with nuclear weapons (the US, Russia, China, France, the UK, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea) have acceded to it. NATO members also largely abstained. The perception in Congress is that it makes no sense to adhere to restrictions that are not also followed by nuclear powers. In this sense, Brazil must make a choice: to side with countries that impose limitations on the development of this type of technology or to remain among the sovereign nations that will make decisions on this issue based on their national security needs.
The CREDN’s decision halted the TPAN’s progress in the legislature, although the issue may still be discussed in other forums. For supporters, it preserves strategic autonomy amid a scenario of global arsenal modernisation. The Lula administration, however, seems oblivious to this debate and has even recently taken a position to categorically reject the development of nuclear weapons.
Lula’s position is counterintuitive, especially considering Brazil’s diplomatic insistence on a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. After all, is there any non-nuclear country with a permanent seat on that body?
Although constitutional and international barriers still exist, the 2025-2026 debate signals that the nuclear issue has quietly returned to the Brazilian defence agenda. Even with resistance from the current government, international turmoil seems to make it inevitable that the nuclear issue will increasingly be included in Brazil’s state affairs.
