The military-political events of February 2022 became a turning point for the European Union’s policy of eastern enlargement. Within a few months, Ukraine and Moldova were granted candidate status for membership, and accession negotiations officially began in June 2024.

At the same time, both countries began consistently aligning their foreign policy with EU decisions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), joining sanctions against Russia and joint EU declarations. This integration process reflects broader shifts in the architecture of European security.

A key factor behind the accelerated movement of Ukraine and Moldova toward the EU is the desire to avoid geopolitical uncertainty on the EU’s eastern borders. The EU acknowledges the risk of growing Russian influence should the European integration of these countries remain frozen or be permanently halted. Beyond geopolitical considerations, an important role is played by the export of democracy, meritocracy, and the principles of European governance.

Ukraine and Moldova have committed to completing internal reforms by 2028, particularly in the area of the rule of law, in order to achieve full EU membership. The synchronicity of the integration process is notable: both countries received candidate status in 2022, began negotiations in 2024, and the European Council’s reports on the alignment of Ukrainian and Moldovan national legislation with EU law were completed in 2025.

Aligning with CFSP decisions means that a third country voluntarily brings its foreign policy into line with the EU’s position – for example, by adopting sanctions – without having a vote in the decision-making process within the Council of the EU. Formally, CFSP decisions are taken unanimously, which creates an opportunity for individual member states to block the process.

This is precisely what Hungary is doing, delaying the opening of a number of negotiating clusters with Ukraine. Moldova, linked to the Ukrainian process, faces a similar blockage of financial and other forms of support. According to the European Commission’s 2025 enlargement report, tentative deadlines for concluding negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine were announced for 2028, contingent on significant changes in the political situation.

Among the positive consequences of Ukraine’s and Moldova’s integration into the CFSP are the strengthening of institutional ties, access to EU financial instruments, and the symbolic consolidation of both countries’ European course. At the same time, risks and open questions for discussion are anticipated.

• First, the problem of the abuse of veto power by individual member states persists.
  
• Second, calculations show that the membership of Ukraine and Moldova will entail significant financial obligations for current EU members – around €19 billion per year in the baseline scenario, which, however, should not radically change the status of most countries as net contributors or net beneficiaries of the budget.
  
• Third, the unprecedented nature of the situation itself is noted: the EU has never before admitted a country in the midst of a military-political crisis and lacking NATO security guarantees, which has given rise to an alternative form of active integration – access to the EU single market prior to formal membership.

The incorporation of Ukraine and Moldova into the EU’s foreign policy orbit reflects both the EU’s response to the changed geopolitical situation and the institutional constraints of the enlargement process itself. Amid growing integration – primarily in the sphere of foreign policy and security – the timeline for full membership remains uncertain, depending on domestic political factors both in the candidate countries and in the EU member states.