Europe is undergoing one of the greatest energy transformations of recent decades. What began as a crisis caused by the breakdown of its energy relations with Russia ended up becoming something much deeper: a structural change in how the continent obtains the energy it needs to function.
And in that transformation, there is an obvious winner: the United States.
While Europe pays more to keep its industries, homes, and electrical systems supplied, Washington has consolidated a privileged position as the continent’s energy supplier.
The phenomenon is not minor.
In the second quarter of 2026, the United States contributed 63.2% of the liquefied natural gas imported by the European Union. And in October, US LNG exports to Europe reached 6.89 million tons, the second highest monthly volume in history. European Commission
The question, then, is no longer just who replaced Russian gas.
The question is:
Who is capturing the economic and strategic value of that replacement?
The answer points directly to the United States.
The gas changed its route
For decades, European industry was built on a relatively simple energy premise: to have large quantities of natural gas by pipeline, mainly from Russia, at comparatively competitive prices.
That model allowed the development of a powerful chemical, metallurgical, manufacturing, automotive, and intermediate goods industries.
Gas was not simply fuel.
It was an industrial advantage.
The war in Ukraine and the subsequent breaking of energy ties between Europe and Russia destroyed that model.
The European Union then accelerated the construction of a new energy architecture based on LNG imported by sea.
The change has been enormous.
Between 2021 and 2025, the share of pipeline gas within European imports fell from approximately 80% to 55%, while LNG increased from 20% to 45%.
Europe stopped relying mainly on a network of gas pipelines. Now it depends much more on the global LNG market.
And there appears the United States.
The American business
The United States has a structural advantage that Europe does not have in the same magnitude:
It has enormous gas reserves, abundant domestic production, and a rapidly expanding liquefaction and export industry.
The European Commission itself acknowledges that the United States has become a key source of gas for Europe since 2022 and that its LNG export capacity is growing rapidly.
By 2025, the United States was already the world’s largest LNG exporter, with approximately 26% of the global market.
And now Europe has become one of its main markets.
It is an extraordinary change. Europe needs energy. The United States has energy to sell.
And the harder it is for Europe to recover cheap gas sources, the greater the strategic value of American LNG.
Something deeper
Here appears the issue that rarely occupies the center of the European energy debate.
The problem is not only how much Europe pays for gas.
The problem is what happens to your industry when the cost of energy remains structurally above that of your competitors.
A factory can survive an energy shock.
What is much more difficult is competing for years with companies located in countries where energy is considerably cheaper.
The European Commission recognizes that the shift from pipeline gas to LNG has increased European exposure to global market conditions. European prices are now much more influenced by global LNG demand, supply constraints, and maritime transport costs.
That is: Europe no longer just buys gas. It buys gas within a global market. And that market has a price.
Nord Stream: the turning point
Here appears one of the most controversial episodes of this transformation.
In September 2022, explosions destroyed three of the four pipelines of Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 in the Baltic Sea.
Nord Stream 1 had been one of the main Russian gas supply routes to Germany.
Nord Stream 2, although it never came into operation, represented the possibility of further expanding that energy relationship.
The explosions definitively changed the scenario.
The physical route that directly connected Russian gas with Germany was destroyed.
But we must be precise.
Ultimate responsibility for the sabotage continues to be a subject of political and judicial controversy.
Sweden closed its investigation for jurisdictional reasons and provided information to Germany. In Germany, however, the investigation continued and a trial is currently underway against Ukrainian suspects; the accused deny their involvement.
Therefore, it would not be responsible to claim that the United States ordered or executed the operation.
But there is a different and perfectly legitimate issue from geopolitical analysis:
Who structurally benefited from the disappearance of that energy infrastructure?
And here the answer is much clearer.
One of the major beneficiaries was the U.S. energy system.
The geopolitics of a destroyed pipeline
The disappearance of Nord Stream eliminated a strategic opportunity for Europe:
to regain large quantities of Russian gas transported directly by pipeline. In its place, a new architecture appeared.
- LNG carriers.
- Regasification terminals.
- LNG contracts.
- Intermediaries.
- International markets.
- And suppliers like the United States.
Transformation does not mean that the United States is the only European supplier. Norway remains fundamental, and other countries also participate in the market.
But the U.S. position is extraordinarily strong.
In 2024, the United States accounted for 16.7% of European natural gas imports in terms of volume; in the specific case of LNG, its share is considerably higher.
The difference is fundamental.
Russian gas arrived mainly by pipeline.
U.S. gas arrives as a global commodity.
And a global commodity has something the pipeline did not have to the same extent:
An international price and multiple potential buyers.
And what is more significant comes through gas tankers that cross the vastness of the Atlantic, which substantially increases freight and transport costs and impacts the final price for consumers.
Europe is deindustrializing; The United States is energizing
Here the industrial dimension appears.
The energy issue does not only affect electricity companies or domestic consumers.
It affects the entire productive structure.
Chemistry.
Steel.
Glass.
Ceramics.
Fertilizers.
Paper.
Automobiles.
Mining.
Heavy industry.
All these sectors need abundant and competitive energy.
European experience after 2022 itself showed that energy-intensive sectors were particularly hit by the price shock. Bruegel studies have pointed out that the loss of cheap Russian gas generated significant pressure on the competitiveness of energy-intensive European industries.
And here a paradox arises.
Europe wants to compete with the United States and China in strategic industries.
But to produce it needs energy.
And a growing portion of that energy must be purchased from external suppliers.
Meanwhile, the United States has abundant domestic gas and an energy industry capable of exporting the surplus.
Europe buys energy. The United States sells energy. And both compete for the industry of the future.
Coincidence or geopolitical architecture?
This is the uncomfortable question.
It goes without saying that every event was planned from Washington to observe that certain events ended up producing extraordinarily favorable results for the United States.
Geopolitics does not work solely through direct orders. It also works through structures of opportunity.
The disappearance of a Russian energy infrastructure.
The gradual exit of Russian gas from the European market.
The expansion of LNG terminals.
The growth of U.S. production.
The European need to secure supplies.
And finally, the emergence of the United States as a strategic energy supplier.
All these elements converge in the same direction.
European energy dependence changed in nature.
The new intermediary
There is also a particularly interesting aspect.
U.S. gas does not necessarily reach Europe through a direct and simple relationship between Washington and a European company.
The LNG market is much more complex.
Producers, marketers, terminal operators, shipping companies, traders, and end buyers are participating.
This allows Washington to expand its market presence even when U.S. gas is traded through intermediaries.
In other words:
The United States does not need to directly control every European contract to benefit from the new system.
It only needs to occupy a dominant position within the supply chain.
And that position has enormous strategic value.
The energy crisis as industrial policy
There is still another dimension.
The United States not only sells gas. It is also competing to attract industry.
A European company facing high energy costs may begin to consider relocating certain investments to the United States.
Why?
Because there he simultaneously finds:
– abundant energy;
– domestic gas;
– energy infrastructure;
– industrial incentives;
– internal market;
– capital;
– technology;
– and access to raw materials.
Energy then ceases to be just a commodity.
It becomes an industrial policy tool.
The European problem
Europe has managed to avoid an energy collapse. That is important to acknowledge.
The European Union has diversified its suppliers, built LNG infrastructure, and considerably reduced its dependence on Russian gas. The European Commission maintains that the European system is better prepared than in 2021-2022 to face supply disruptions.
But energy security and industrial competitiveness are not exactly the same thing.
Europe can have enough gas.
The question is:
At what cost? Because an industrial economy not only needs available energy. It needs competitive energy.
And here lies the great paradox:
Europe tried to free itself from energy dependence. And it partially succeeded.
But in doing so, it entered a global energy market in which the United States holds an increasingly powerful position.
Dependence changed. From Moscow to global markets.
And within those markets, Washington has gained a privileged position.
That is why the European energy crisis must be analyzed beyond the price of gas.
We are facing a transformation of economic power.
- Those who control competitive energy can attract industry.
- Those who control infrastructure can influence trade routes.
- Those who control energy technologies can impose standards.
And those with energy surpluses can turn them into geopolitical influence.
The question Europe must answer
Europe has built an energy strategy based on diversification. But diversifying suppliers does not necessarily mean achieving strategic autonomy.
If one power replaces another as the dominant supplier, the dependence simply changes. True autonomy requires something different:
Ability to produce abundant, safe, and competitive energy within the economic area itself.
As long as Europe does not solve this problem, it will continue to face a paradox.
You need energy to sustain your industry.
But the more expensive that energy is, the harder it will be to sustain your industry.
And the greater their need to import LNG, the greater the business of the large exporters.
Among them, the United States.
Conclusión
The story of the European energy crisis cannot be reduced to Russia versus Europe.
There is a third dimension that deserves much more attention:
United States.
Washington did not necessarily trigger every event that led to the current European energy configuration. But it is indisputable that the United States has emerged as one of the main economic and strategic beneficiaries of the transformation.
The destruction of Nord Stream eliminated infrastructure that could keep a direct supply route of Russian gas to Europe open. The war accelerated the energy breakdown. Europe progressively replaced pipeline gas with LNG. And the United States, having become the world’s largest LNG exporter, found a gigantic market in Europe.
The consequence is a new equation:
Russia lost the market. Europe lost cheap energy. The United States gained the energy market.
And while Europe tries to rebuild its industrial competitiveness within a new energy reality, Washington has something that has become one of the most important economic weapons of the 21st century: abundant energy for himself and energy to sell to the rest of the world.
The big question for Europe is no longer just where its next gas shipment will come from.
It is much more strategic:
Can an industrial power maintain its economic autonomy if it does not control the cost of the energy that powers its industry?
And that question goes beyond Europe.
Because what is happening on the European continent could become the model for the new energy geopolitics of the 21st century.
Power is no longer measured only by who has oil.
Also by who owns gas, who can sell it, who controls the routes, and above all, who can afford cheap energy while their competitors have to buy it expensively.