One of the key issues of geopolitics in general and geoeconomics in particular is the cost of gas, its continuous supply, and European energy security.
Because of this, we consulted economist Isaac Levi about this dimension, who is also a renowned international energy analyst and Head of the Energy and Policy Analysis Team (Europe-Russia) at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA)
Below are Mr. Isaac Levi’s views:
The EU’s ban on short-term contracts barely dented imports of Russian LNG. Imports fell by just 1.2% in the six months following its effect on 25 April 2026, compared with the same months of 2025. Without a full legal ban, companies will keep buying whatever boosts their profit margins, not what serves the EU’s energy security.
That changes on 1 January 2027, and Russia’s LNG sector is likely to struggle because it relies so heavily on the EU: the EU took 46% of Russia’s LNG exports between January and October 2026 and around 95% of Yamal LNG’s exports in the first half of 2026. Most of those cargoes will have to go to China and elsewhere in Asia via longer routes, with higher transport costs, and only a small fleet of ice-class tankers able to carry them. Buyers there will know that Russia has few other markets left and can push the price down.
The sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project already sold its cargoes to China at a 30-40% discount in 2025. Phasing out Russian fossil fuels strengthens the EU’s energy security and cuts the money flowing into the Kremlin’s war chest: EU buyers paid an estimated EUR 7.3 bn for Russian LNG between January and October 2026, according to CREA’s data, payments that undermine the EU’s own support for Ukraine.
That is money the EU must instead invest in improving its own energy security and enabling the clean energy transition.