German gas and Europe’s mistakes

November 18, 2026

The Expert Analytical Association “Sovereignty” consulted me how to interpret news regarding potential supply difficulties for Germany in the event of an especially harsh winter, due to low gas storage levels.


I discussed it with Piergiorgio Rosso, a friend and former manager of Eni, the Italian energy giant. Rosso is a long-time collaborator of our working group, driven for years by the Venetian economist Gianfranco La Grassa, recently deceased, and by his theoretical elaborations on politics and economics.

He pointed out to me that in Germany they seem to have made the purchase timing wrong. In spring-summer 2026, faced with exceptionally high prices, they would have chosen to wait for discounts that never came. Usually, at that time, gas costs less and it’s better to fill storage to resell it during the winter. This time the bill didn’t add up.

In Italy, he also reminded me, the government had instead mandated operators to buy, bringing storage to 90%. Agostino Scornajenchi, CEO of Snam, claimed the result at the a/symmetrie conference, the association founded by Lega area economist Alberto Bagnai, in Montesilvano, near Pescara. According to Rosso, however, Germany will not remain in the cold: it will more likely return to turning on coal power plants. This would allow saving part of the gas used in electricity production without directly replacing it in boilers and industrial processes. But the point we focused on is above all another: we are facing a classic market failure, in a context strongly influenced by strategic conflicts.

INES itself points out that the lack of economic convenience has slowed storage filling. S&P Global confirms that buying gas to store and resell it in winter did not guarantee a profitable profit. The individual operator does the math, but the sum of these calculations does not guarantee a country’s energy security at all. Berlin thus took action by commissioning SEFE to buy more gas.

Here the reasoning must broaden, and it is precisely La Grassa’s lesson that helps us. Economic rationality, the calculation of costs and returns, is embedded in a broader conflict, in which it is decided who commands and who endures others’ decisions. Economic strategies intertwine with political and military ones, with factions and with the struggle for supremacy. Treating the economy as a sphere that explains itself prevents understanding what is happening.

The choices of Germany and Europe only marginally concern economic convenience. Economically, however, they seem rather irrational to us. A pipeline, a supply contract, the renunciation of a producer affect relations between states, consolidate alliances, or break them. This is what was done with Russia.

Energy, especially in this multipolar phase, is a vehicle for geopolitics and power relations. What damages an industrial system can favor the strengthening of a competing power. And the latter can very well be what we continue to call an ally.

Stopping at the German mistake on stockpiling therefore means losing sight of the main issue. Many more mistakes will be made if Europe continues to follow US dictates. Reducing dependence on Russia was presented as a gain of autonomy and also as a tool to pressure Moscow. It did not work and was not even consistent with our European strategic interests. It was another gift to Washington, or rather, if I took it.

Meanwhile, according to ACER, in 2025 the United States supplied 58% of the LNG imported by the Union, equivalent to about a quarter of total gas demand. We have reduced one dependence and increased another that was already overwhelming in many other respects. Calling it emancipation or worse differentiation is propaganda from European leadership groups, who certainly do not think about European citizens but follow American strategic interests.

The Grassa linked the autonomy of European countries to strengthening multipolarism and overcoming subordination to the United States. The relationship with Russia had to be considered from this perspective, without moralizing; the possibility of expanding our room for maneuver mattered. Everything stems from this vulnerability.

The EU did the opposite, adopting a greater and now restrictive alignment with Washington as the criterion of its choices, economic but not only, and passing it off as a European interest. German stockpiles are a piece of this story.

The calculation of convenience is left to operators, after having compromised supply conditions on the geopolitical level. Now that the bill doesn’t add up, action is being taken to contradict all previous policies that have already come at a heavy cost. This is the way to sink. But even public intervention does not solve the underlying problem if those who lead it continue to operate within a strategy decided elsewhere.

We can also fill our stocks. It remains to be seen whether we are still able to decide for ourselves from whom to buy, under what conditions, and in whose interest. If before the Americans left more room for economic decisions, now they have also reduced space on this front, because everything falls within their security. And this, needless to say, is a loose concept that now encompasses everything.

But certainly this will not happen as long as the European leadership groups owe their permanence to those across the Atlantic, to whom they are bound by strong ties of servility. They stand together, they fall together.

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