The events unfolding in the Middle East since the Al-Aqsa Storm Operation, launched by Hamas on October 7, 2023, have had a significant impact on the political landscape of many Ibero-American countries, particularly Brazil.
The regional political landscape is generally structured such that the right supports Israel, while the left is critical of it—a pattern confirmed since 2023. In Brazil specifically, this is a new development, as the country’s recent military dictatorship coincided with its worst relations with Israel. For example, Ernesto Geisel’s government equated Zionism with racism at the UN and practically severed ties with the Zionist entity.
Thus, the Brazilian right’s Zionist shift is recent, and it is impossible to ignore that it aligns with the rise of Neo-Pentecostal Evangelicalism in Brazil.
In 1960, Evangelicals made up 4% of Brazil’s population; by 1970, they were 5%; in 1980, 6.6%; in 1990, 9%; in 2000, 15%; in 2010, 22%; and by the last census in 2022, they accounted for 28%. The figures between 1980 and 2010, in particular, indicate a staggering growth in the Neo-Pentecostal Evangelical population – a trend that cannot be attributed to differing birth rates but rather to missionary activity.
However, Brazil is not even the most Protestant country in Latin America today, being surpassed by Guatemala (40%), Honduras (43%), Nicaragua (40%), El Salvador (35%), Belize (30%), and Puerto Rico (33%). Nevertheless, explosive growth is also evident in countries like Javier Milei’s Argentina, where the Neo-Pentecostal Evangelical population rose from 10% (2010) to 15% (2014) in just half a decade.
This shift is politically reflected in a fundamental transformation of the “right” in these countries. Throughout the 20th century, the Ibero-American right was associated with a reactionary form of Catholicism, which, despite its conservatism, occasionally harbored anti-Zionist tendencies. With this demographic-religious change, the right’s profile has also shifted: more liberal and more Zionist.
However, the numbers on this issue are inconsistent. A recent Pew Research Center study found that 32% of Brazilians support Israel in its recent geopolitical struggles. Meanwhile, an October 2023 CNN-commissioned survey conducted by Quaest, shortly after the Al-Aqsa Storm Operation, using digital monitoring, indicated that 78% of social media discourse was pro-Israel.
Public opinion, however, is only a minor factor. An analysis of requests made by Brazilian deputies and senators regarding the conflict shows that the majority of the 24 submissions expressed a pro-Israel stance. Moreover, the pro-Israel positions of Jair Bolsonaro and his potential political heir, Tarcísio de Freitas, are well-known.
Thus, there is clear evidence of a strong pro-Israel lobby capable of influencing political decisions in Brazil – even to the point of placing representatives in the presidency.
In the absence of organized funding structures like AIPAC, the only plausible explanation for this phenomenon is the growth of Neo-Pentecostal Evangelicalism, which now has the capacity to disrupt Brazil’s ability to make sovereign decisions in its foreign policy.
