A geostrategic analysis of the real cost of unconditional support for the Kiev regime

Since 24 February 2022, Spain has delivered weapons worth more than 1,000 million euros to Ukraine (Leopard 2A4 tanks, Hawk and Aspide anti-aircraft systems, Patriot missiles, armoured vehicles, generators, medical supplies and ammunition of all calibers). It has trained more than 4,000 Ukrainian military personnel at the Toledo base, welcomed more than 220,000 refugees and committed new shipments of material at every NATO summit and every meeting of the Ramstein Contact Group.

All this has been done under the umbrella of “European solidarity” and the “defence of democratic values”. No one disputes the moral legitimacy of helping an invaded country. The question that arises here is another: what price is Spain paying in terms of effective sovereignty, strategic autonomy and national security for this seamless alignment with the strategy designed in Washington and executed from Brussels? This article does not judge the Kiev government or enter into the legitimacy of its territorial claims. It limits itself to examining, with geostrategic coolness, whether unlimited support for Ukraine strengthens or weakens Spain’s permanent interests.

The Spanish geostrategic framework: permanent interests

Spain is a medium power with three historical red lines that no government can ignore without putting the very existence of the state at risk:

1. Effective control of the Strait of Gibraltar and the security of Europe’s southern flank.
   
2. Stability in the Maghreb and the control of irregular migratory flows from north-west Africa.
   
3. The preservation of territorial unity in the face of internal separatism and the question of Gibraltar.

These interests require, historically, two conditions:a) Maintain functional relations (not necessarily cordial) with Russia, an energy supplier until 2021 and a permanent member of the Security Council with veto power over resolutions affecting Western Sahara.b) Avoid unlimited involvement in extra-European conflicts that do not directly threaten the Mediterranean-Sahelian Arc of Crisis.

For decades, Spain practised a foreign policy of “active equidistance” in major global conflicts: neither with Washington nor with Moscow to the limit, always leaving room for negotiation. That was the doctrine of the Transition and the one that allowed Felipe González to reject the deployment of Pershing missiles in Torrejón or José María Aznar (despite the Azores) to maintain a pragmatic relationship with Putin on energy matters.

That room for manoeuvre has evaporated since 2022.

Direct and indirect costs of alignment with Kiev

Loss of energy autonomy: Until February 2022, Russia supplied between 10% and 15% of Spanish natural gas at very competitive prices and through long-term contracts. Spain voluntarily renounced that source and imposed an embargo on itself that not even the EU required of all its members (Hungary, for example, maintains its contracts with Gazprom). The gap has been filled:

• Algeria (which has raised prices and threatens periodic cuts).
  
• U.S. and Qatari LNG (up to 400% more expensive at peaks in 2022-2023 and with additional regasification costs).

The result: Spain’s energy bill has skyrocketed structurally. Key industrial sectors (ceramics in Castellón, Basque steel, Catalan and Galician automotive) have lost competitiveness. Spanish core inflation has consistently been higher than the eurozone average since 2022, eroding purchasing power and social cohesion.

Erosion of the relationship with Algeria: Algeria is not just any supplier: it is the current main supplier (≈45% of gas) and shares 1,000 km of land and sea border with vital Spanish interests (Ceuta, Melilla, Canary Islands, fisheries).

Algiers perceives Spain’s alignment with NATO in Ukraine as part of a hostile axis that includes:

• The Spanish turn of March 2022 on Western Sahara (explicit support for the Moroccan autonomy proposal).
  
• The growing presence of U.S. ships and planes in Rota and Morón.

Concrete consequences:

• Closure of the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline (which passed through Morocco) in October 2021, followed by recurring tensions over the Medgaz.
  
• Explicit threats from Algiers to cut off supplies if Spain re-exports Algerian gas to other European countries (a clause that Spain accepted in 2022).
  
• A 30-40% increase in Algerian gas prices compared to previous contracts.

Spain is currently trapped in an energy grip: dependent on a supplier that considers it an enemy and paying spot market prices for U.S. LNG.

Unnecessary military exposure: The shipment of critical material to Ukraine has left the Spanish Army in an unprecedented situation of vulnerability:

• Reserves of 155 mm ammunition under minimums.
  
• Only 50-60 operational Leopard 2A4s after delivering 20+10 to Ukraine.
  
• Patriot anti-aircraft systems with fewer batteries than necessary to defend the national territory in the event of a high-intensity conflict.

In return, NATO is pushing for:

• Permanently increase the U.S. presence in Rota (from 4 to 6 Aegis destroyers) and Morón.
  
• To turn Spain into a logistical rearguard of a possible conflict in the East.

Spain thus becomes a potential target without having gained anything in return.

Vulnerability to Russia in the theatres where we do have something at stake: Russia does not need to invade Spain to harm us.

 It is enough for you:

• Intensify its support for the military juntas in the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger), which have already expelled France and complicate the security of Ceuta, Melilla and the Canary Islands.
  
• Strengthen its naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean and its cooperation with Libya and Algeria in the control of migratory routes.
  
• Reactivate disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks against Catalan or Basque targets (precedent: illegal referendum of 2017).

Each new announcement of the shipment of tanks or Patriot missiles from Madrid reinforces the Russian perception of Spain as an active enemy, increasing the likelihood of asymmetric retaliation in our weak points.

The Spanish historical precedent: when Madrid knew how to say “no”

• 1953: Spain signs agreements with the United States but maintains full diplomatic relations with the USSR.
  
• 1982-1986: Felipe González joins NATO but removes Spain from the integrated military command and rejects the installation of nuclear weapons.
  
• 2003-2004: Aznar participates in the photo of the Azores but Zapatero withdraws troops from Iraq as soon as he comes to power, without this implying a break with Washington.

The lesson we can draw from these facts is that medium-sized countries preserve their sovereignty by always keeping one foot outside the dominant bloc. When they get all the way in, they pay.

Future scenarios and realistic policy recommendations

At this point, two possible scenarios can be proposed based on this point:

Scenario A – Continuity of total alignment

• Chronic energy dependence.
  
• Definitive rupture with Algeria.
  
• Possible involvement in the NATO-Russia conflict.
  
• Weakening of the Spanish position in Gibraltar (the United Kingdom will take advantage) and the Sahara.

Scenario B – Discreet and pragmatic rebalancing

1. Progressively reduce Spain’s military profile in Ukraine (limit itself to humanitarian aid and non-lethal material).
   
2. Reactivate diplomatic channels reserved with Moscow on issues of mutual interest: migration control, the fight against terrorism, Western Sahara.
   
3. Diversify real energy suppliers (Nigeria, Norway, Azerbaijan) without demonizing Russia out of dogma.
   
4. Lead a bloc of countries within the EU (together with Italy, Hungary, Austria, Slovakia) that promotes a negotiated ceasefire and the recovery of European strategic autonomy.

In conclusion, it can be said, in general terms, that Spain has no vital interests in who controls the Donbas, Crimea or Kharkiv. It does have a power to keep the Strait of Gibraltar open, to avoid a massive migratory crisis from the Maghreb and to preserve territorial unity.

Unconditional and unlimited support for the Kiev government does not strengthen our sovereignty: it erodes it on three simultaneous fronts (energy, Maghreb and defence). A responsible foreign policy distinguishes between desirable European solidarity and suicidal strategic submission.

It is time to recover the old Spanish principle of thinking first of Spain. Not out of selfishness, but because only a sovereign country can be a reliable long-term ally.