In recent months, Tom Barrack — the U.S. special envoy to Turkey and Syria under the Donald Trump administration — has sparked intense regional debate by suggesting unusual rapprochements between Syria and Lebanon that some sectors interpret as the seed of a possible confederation or strategic union between the two countries.
Although Barrack has not publicly proposed a formal annexation plan, his statements have been interpreted by political adversaries as implying that Lebanon could eventually be “reinforced” into a broader political scheme with Damascus.
Barrack has commented that the Levant — Syria and Lebanon — shares ancient cultural and civilizational ties, and that solving their crises involves “bringing” both nations closer together, aligning civilizations now fractured by modern wars and 20th-century borders.
His remarks even revived historical concepts of Bilad al-Sham (“Greater Syria”), the geopolitical space that before colonial partition included Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel/Palestine.
From Washington’s perspective, an agreement between Damascus and Beirut that reduces the influence of militias or non-state armed actors — such as Hezbollah in Lebanon — and channels their forces toward state structures could, in theory, reduce regional tensions and limit the presence of groups backed by Iran.
Barrack himself has stressed the need for Lebanon to control its own territory and weapons outside of state authority, criticizing the prevalence of militias as a direct competitor to the state and its legitimacy.
But the Lebanese and wider regional response has been one of rejection and caution. Political figures such as Nabih Berri, the speaker of the Lebanese Parliament and a Hezbollah ally, labeled the idea of institutional linkage between Lebanon and Syria as “absolutely unacceptable,” noting that such comments do not respect Beirut’s sovereignty. This reaction reflects the deep historical and political sensitivities surrounding the relationship between the two countries—especially after decades of Syrian occupation of Lebanon and internal conflicts.
Additionally, forces like Hezbollah not only reject demilitarization, but assert that resistance is part of national identity and that they will not relinquish their weapons under external pressure. For many Lebanese, autonomy and internal political pluralism are priorities over any external confederal project.
In energy terms, a Syrian-Lebanese bloc could be seen as strategic for Washington if one considers export routes, gas supply, or alternative overland passages in the Levant, although there are no indications of a detailed plan or real economic backing behind this idea.
Thus, Barrack’s proposal appears more like a diplomatic instrument to pressure internal reforms than a concrete roadmap for a new regional order. The outright rejection from Lebanese leaders suggests that the idea — for now — remains rhetorical rather than a viable policy for state reorganization.
Should such a proposal materialize, the United States would once again position itself to strategically protect Israelfrom its historical adversaries, particularly forces backed by Iran. By promoting greater political and security integration in the Levant, Washington seeks to provide long-term guarantees for Israel’s regional security, potentially reducing Iranian influence and neutralizing perceived threats along Israel’s northern borders.
