The EU is caught up in its own energy crisis

August 25, 2026

Nikola Jović

Introduction

The European Union moved from one difficult position to another. Its main geopolitical rival was also its principal supplier of energy. Once relations with Russia deteriorated, the EU was forced to conserve energy, temporarily return to coal, diversify its supplies of gas, oil, and LNG, and pay significantly higher prices. At the same time, it became increasingly dependent on suppliers from which it may not be able to disengage as easily as it did from Russia, most notably the United States.

These developments were largely a consequence of the war in Ukraine, which has continued since 2014 and has repeatedly raised fears of a wider confrontation, given the number of actors involved directly or indirectly. As the conflict intensified, so did the EU’s effort to sever economic and political ties with Russia. Energy cooperation was arguably the most important and visible element of that relationship.

Although the arrangement had benefited both sides, the imbalance was evident from the beginning: the EU needed Russian energy more than Russia needed the European market. The past few years appear to have confirmed this. Russia has been more successful in finding alternative markets for its energy exports than the EU has been in replacing Russian supplies.

Russia’s New Markets

The most significant shift occurred in the oil sector. In 2020, Europe received 51% of Russian crude oil and condensate exports; by 2024, its share had fallen to 12%. Over the same period, Asia and Oceania increased their share from 41% to 81% of Russian exports.[1]

Oil derivatives — including diesel, fuel oil, naphtha, gasoline, and other refinery products — were redirected differently from crude oil. In this category, Turkey emerged as the main buyer.

The distribution of Russian oil-derivative exports was as follows: Turkey accounted for 25%, China for 12%, Brazil for 11%, and all other buyers for the remaining 52%.

CREA data covering the period until the end of 2024 show that Turkey alone purchased approximately one quarter of Russian oil-derivative exports, while China and Brazil became the next two most important markets.[2]

This issue also matters for the EU. Part of Russia’s crude oil is refined in India, Turkey, and other third countries. Once processed, these products can legally enter the European market if they are no longer classified as Russian in origin. This does not necessarily mean that the EU is directly purchasing Russian diesel. However, it does demonstrate how global refining and trade routes can indirectly reshape supply flows. In practice, there is substantial evidence that Russian-origin crude continues to reach European consumers through third-country processing, often at a higher price.[3]

Regarding coal, the EU banned imports of Russian coal in August 2022. Most of the affected exports were redirected to Asia and Turkey.

The distribution of Russian coal exports was as follows: China accounted for 46%, India for 17%, Turkey for 10%, South Korea for 10%, Taiwan for 5%, and other buyers for 12%. These figures are cumulative from 5th December 2022 to the end of 2024. Independent EIA statistics for 2024 confirm the same trend: China received slightly more than half of Russian coal exports, while Europe received only 13%, almost all of which went to Turkey, a country outside the EU.[4]

China has therefore become the principal substitute for the European market, while India, South Korea, and Turkey form a second group of important buyers.

The issue of natural gas illustrates the EU’s contradictory position particularly clearly. While restricting the import of several Russian energy products, the EU has continued — albeit at lower levels — to import Russian LNG.

In 2024, Europe remained the largest destination for Russian LNG. Europe accounted for 52% of exports, Asia for 45%, Turkey for around 1%, and unknown or other destinations for approximately 1%. Russia exported a record 33.6 million tonnes of LNG in 2024. Europe bought around 17.4 million tonnes, while Asia bought approximately 15.2 million tonnes. Within Asia, the main buyers were China, with around 7 million tonnes, and Japan, with approximately 5.7 million tonnes.[5]

In pipeline gas, China has become the main driver of growth. Russian deliveries to China increased from 0.34 billion cubic feet per day in 2020 to 2.99 billion cubic feet per day in 2024.

However, this does not amount to a full replacement for the lost Western European market, either in terms of volume or infrastructure. Turkey received approximately 2.03 billion cubic feet per day of Russian pipeline gas in 2024.

In short, Russia has largely redirected its oil and coal exports toward Asia, primarily China and India. In the market for oil derivatives, Turkey has become the central destination. In gas, however, the redirection remains limited: the EU continues to be a major buyer of Russian LNG and residual pipeline gas, while China is growing as a market but has not yet replaced Europe in full.

EU’s New Supliers

How successfully has the EU adapted to the new circumstances created by its sanctions on Russia? The answer depends on the criteria used. The EU has diversified its supply routes and reduced its direct dependence on Russia, but it has done so at a considerable economic cost.

Until 2021, Russia was the Union’s main external energy supplier:

Natural gas: Russia accounted for 45% of EU gas imports, or around 152 billion cubic metres in 2021. Most supplies arrived through pipelines, and dependence was particularly high in Central and Eastern Europe.
Crude oil: Russia supplied 27% of EU crude-oil imports at the beginning of 2022. Large volumes arrived both by sea and through the Druzhba pipeline.
Coal: Russia was a significant supplier until 2022, although coal could be replaced more easily on the global market than pipeline gas.[6]

This model made economic sense. It relied on established pipeline infrastructure, long-term contracts, and relatively affordable Russian gas. At the same time, it created a concentration risk: disruption involving a single major supplier could affect the entire European energy system. This is precisely what occurred after 2022. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the imposition of sanctions, supply disruptions, and lower Russian deliveries, the EU introduced the REPowerEU strategy. It focused on energy savings, the accelerated development of renewables, filling gas-storage facilities, and diversifying energy imports. The consequences were significant:

Russian gas imports fell from 152 bcm in 2021 to approximately 52 bcm in 2024, reducing Russia’s share from 45% to 19% of total EU gas imports.[7] According to the latest Commission estimate, Russian gas imports fell further to 36 bcm in 2025, or 12% of total imports. Russian pipeline-gas supplies fell from 137 bcm in 2021 to 18 bcm in 2025.[8]

Russian oil imports fell from 27% to around 3% in 2024 and to 2% in 2025. The remaining flows were largely limited to a small number of countries and specific routes.[9]

Russian coal was effectively removed from the EU energy mix after the import ban introduced in 2022.[10]

New Sources And Structure

Russian gas was not replaced by one supplier, but by a broader portfolio of sources.

Norway became the EU’s most important supplier of pipeline gas, accounting for 45.6% of EU gaseous natural-gas imports in 2024. Algeria ranked second, with 19.3%.

The United States became a key supplier of LNG. In 2024, it accounted for 45.3% of EU LNG imports.[11]

Russia, however, remained the EU’s second-largest LNG supplier in 2024, with a 17.5% share. This demonstrates that the reduction of dependence on Russian pipeline gas did not automatically lead to the immediate disappearance of Russian LNG from the European market.

In the oil sector, Russian barrels were replaced by increased imports from the United States, Norway, Kazakhstan, the Middle East, and West Africa. Oil is easier to redirect than gas because it can be transported by sea and traded on a global market. Diversification was therefore technically simpler, even if it often came at a higher cost.

Impact Assessment

The EU has strengthened its energy security by reducing dependence on a single dominant supplier. However, this has created another form of vulnerability: a greater reliance on the global LNG market, import terminals, shipping routes, and volatile international prices. These markets are generally less predictable than long-term pipeline contracts.

The most immediate consequence was the price shock of 2022–2023, which put considerable pressure on households and energy-intensive industries. In the longer term, the EU aims not only to replace Russian gas with alternative imports but also to reduce total consumption of fossil gas through energy efficiency, renewable energy, electrification, and biomethane.

What Next- Winter Is Coming

The EU is legally committed to fully phasing out Russian gas imports. Russian LNG is scheduled to be phased out by the end of 2026, while remaining pipeline-gas imports are expected to end by autumn 2027 at the latest. The EU also aims to eliminate the remaining imports of Russian oil by the end of 2027, requiring the countries that still import it to prepare diversification plans. However, as the European summer — particularly hot this year — draws to a close and winter approaches, concerns are once again emerging over whether the EU’s energy reserves will be sufficient for colder months.

Muriel Motte, a journalist in the economics department, stated the following:

“According to Data Gaz data, the fill rate of French gas storage facilities is approximately 64.5%, and 61.6% in the European Union. Is this historically low for this time of year?

-Yes, absolutely. The fill level on the same date last year was 74% at the European level and 81.7% for France. Even in 2021, when Gazprom intentionally did not fill its storage facilities, the fill level was higher (European storage facilities were 63% full on August 19, 2021, vs. 61.6% this year). Operators have until the end of October to fill their storage facilities. We are theoretically in the most active period for doing so. This is not the case for a number of reasons…”[12]

Despite these figures, the EU remains publicly optimistic. According to European Commission spokesperson Eva Hrcinová, “everything is going well.” Yet European gas-storage facilities are only around 62% full, while French facilities stand at approximately 64%, compared with a level of roughly 80% that would normally be expected at this stage. Current supplies do not appear equally secure for all member states.[13]

The policy of cutting energy ties with Russia may have produced immediate geopolitical results, but the longer-term consequences for the EU remain uncertain. Russian energy resources and the existing pipeline infrastructure have not disappeared. They remain in place, awaiting a possible political change that could reopen the prospect of energy cooperation.

Conclusion- Authors Opinion

The EU has moved from a model in which Russian gas formed the basis of its energy system to one based on multiple suppliers, LNG, and lower gas consumption. This model is more geopolitically resilient, but on average it is less commercially efficient and more expensive than the system that existed before 2022.

Such a shift may be understandable under the current circumstances. However, the present situation is not necessarily permanent. The EU and Russia could, in principle, again become economic partners, as they were in the past — even during the Cold War, when political tensions were often higher than they are today. At that time, energy cooperation was frequently based on a simple formula: Russian energy in exchange for European technology.

The question is what prevents a similar arrangement today. One explanation is the strategic role of the United States, which has little interest in seeing a close political and economic partnership emerge between the EU and Russia. From this perspective, a durable EU–Russia alignment could weaken the importance of the United States as Europe’s security guarantor and reduce Washington’s influence over European policy.

Supporters of this view argue that the United States benefits from a Europe that remains strategically dependent on Washington and politically distant from Moscow. The EU, in turn, risks finding itself in the least favourable position: confronting Russia while becoming more dependent on the United States for energy and security.

Russia has found ways to mitigate the effects of sanctions by redirecting energy exports and maintaining trade relations with major non-Western economies. Meanwhile, the United States has continued to pursue its own interests in relation to Russia, while the EU has borne a substantial part of the economic cost of the confrontation.

The central question is how long this situation can continue and whether European countries will find the political strength and leadership needed to avoid long-term economic exhaustion in a proxy confrontation with Moscow. If not, the future brings nothing pleasant for the European Union.

[1] https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=65885

[2] https://energyandcleanair.org/december-2024-monthly-analysis-of-russian-fossil-fuel-exports-and-sanctions/

[3] https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-vladimir-putin-russia-fuel-imports-india-war-in-ukraine-price-cap-sanction/

[4] https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=66044

[5]https://meduza.io/en/news/2025/01/28/russia-s-lng-exports-hit-record-high-in-2024-with-over-half-going-to-europe

[6] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/strategy/repowereu-phase-out-russian-energy-imports/repowereu-4-years_en

[7]https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/repowereu-3-years-commission-takes-stock-progress-phase-out-russian-fossil-fuels-2025-05-16_en

[8] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/strategy/repowereu-phase-out-russian-energy-imports/repowereu-4-years_en

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11]https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_imports_of_energy_products_-_latest_developments

[12]https://www.lopinion.fr/economie/il-ne-faut-pas-craindre-une-penurie-de-gaz-mais-une-hausse-des-prix?utm_medium=reload2