The signing of the “Isaac Accords” between Javier Milei and Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem marks a new moment in Israel’s projection toward Latin America. It is not merely a bilateral agreement between Argentina and Israel, but a hemispheric strategic framework aimed at strengthening political, technological, economic, and security cooperation between Israel and ideologically aligned Latin American governments.
According to recent diplomatic analyses, the accords seek to articulate cooperation in security, artificial intelligence, innovation, air connectivity, the fight against terrorism, antisemitism, drug trafficking, and Iranian influence networks in the Western Hemisphere.
The central point is that Argentina now appears as Israel’s platform of entry into South America. Milei, who has deepened an unrestricted and unqualified alliance with Netanyahu and Washington, has turned Argentine foreign policy into an instrument of automatic alignment with the Anglo-Zionist axis (Washington–Tel Aviv). The initiative was born in association with the Genesis Prize received by Milei and seeks to replicate, in Latin America, the logic of the Abraham Accords previously applied in the Middle East.
Unlike the “Abraham Accords,” in which the United States acted as the great architect of Arab-Israeli normalization, the Isaac Accords seem to outline an architecture more directly led by the Israel–Argentina axis, with U.S. backing. The prestigious global law firm DLA Piper notes that the U.S. ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, attended the event as Donald Trump’s emissary, confirming that the project operates within a Washington–Tel Aviv–Buenos Aires triangulation.
The regional ambition is evident. Israeli diplomatic sources cited by the digital outlet Jewish Insider state that Ecuador and Paraguay could join, while Israeli media have mentioned interest from Costa Rica, Panama, and Uruguay. Other media have also reported that the initiative aims to expand in 2026 toward Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and possibly El Salvador. In the case of Peru, for now, one must speak of a geopolitical hypothesis, not confirmed accession.
The security impact would be profound. For Argentina, it entails greater cooperation with Israel in intelligence, counterterrorism, dual-use technology, and financial control. Argentina’s recent designation of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard as a “terrorist organization” confirms this orientation, in a context where Buenos Aires aligns itself with Israel and the United States against Iran.
For other Latin American countries, joining this framework could mean uncritically importing Israel’s security priorities into the continent: Iran, Hezbollah, preventive intelligence, borders, technological surveillance, and military-police cooperation.
Regional responses will depend on the political correlation of forces. Governments critical of Israel, sovereigntist movements, national-popular forces, and multipolar actors will see these accords as an extra-hemispheric strategic penetration that subordinates Latin American foreign policy to the interests of Tel Aviv and Washington.
In this sense, Latin America may become a new field of dispute between a pro-Israeli unipolar bloc and multipolar forces that reject the conversion of the continent into the geopolitical rear guard of foreign wars.
The decisive question is whether the region will accept becoming Israel’s security periphery or whether it will rebuild a sovereign foreign policy capable of engaging with all poles of power without being captured by any of them.
