The recent Israeli attack on Hamas leaders has reignited a debate that seemed forgotten: the creation of a cohesive Arab-Islamic army capable of shielding the security of its members from external offensives. The extraordinary summit in Qatar, marked by strong internal divisions, highlighted both the urgency and the difficulty of moving towards an ‘Arab mini-NATO’. Although Egypt and Pakistan pushed for the proposal, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates blocked it, leaving its viability in limbo.

This move did not come out of nowhere; it is a direct response to Israel’s aggressive and systematic behavior, which has caused several Arab and Muslim states to feel exposed, betrayed by Western allies, and dependent on the protection of the United States, a country that, in this case, deactivated its air defenses in Doha, leaving the region vulnerable to lethal attacks. Israel’s unilateralism and US passivity have made it clear that the West does not guarantee any security and, on the contrary, fuels Tel Aviv’s sense of impunity.

 Historically, the idea of an Arab military bloc is not new. Previous attempts, from the 1960s to the Joint Arab Force of 2015, failed due to coordination issues, internal political divisions, and logistical limitations.

Today, following the attack in Doha, Egypt and other powerful countries in the region attempted to revive the idea, but internal political divisions, reflected in the refusal of Qatar and the Emirates, once again prevented a real consensus from being reached, although a rotating command and combined land, air, and sea units were proposed.

However, differences between members—from Saudi Arabia to small states such as Kuwait—make rapid operational integration difficult. The initiative seems more like a political gesture of unity in the face of Israel’s unilateral and genocidal military policies in Gaza and the United States, which with its unconditional support encourages fanaticism and aggression without accountability, than a functional army.

As Boris Nad pointed out in 2022, “the era of large blocs is back,” something already seen in the strategic pact between Russia and North Korea. Today, the Pakistan-Saudi Arabia alliance reflects the same logic: states seek to form regional blocs that ensure their autonomy and deterrence against external offensives, reducing their dependence on the West. The Arab-Islamic NATO is part of this trend, seeking to consolidate a united regional front against threats such as Israel’s actions in Gaza and the West Bank, where occupation, targeted bombings, and economic blockade reveal a pattern of systematic violence endorsed by Washington.

Faced with the emergence of this possible Arab-Islamic NATO, regional and global actors would react strategically according to their historical and geopolitical interests.

• Israel, responsible for provoking the insecurity that motivates these alliances, would reject the initiative and seek to reinforce its security with Western allies, maintaining its policy of impunity and selective aggression in Gaza and other Palestinian areas.
  
• Turkey could offer political support, especially to Qatar, but would avoid direct military involvement so as not to strain relations with the West.
  
• Iran would likely welcome the proposal diplomatically as a pan-regional Islamic bloc, although its historical tensions with some Arab states would limit its practical integration.
  
• The United States, for its part, would observe cautiously, backing Israel’s security, weakening critical defenses, and trying to control the agenda to maintain its unipolar hegemony in the region.
  
• Britain would try to moderate the situation through diplomacy, warning against “militarization” but remaining a loyal mediator to the Western status quo.

Even if this Arab NATO were to consolidate, its capabilities would be directed primarily at the defense of member states, not direct intervention in Gaza or the West Bank. Israel’s military superiority, the interference of external actors such as the US, and the diversity of interests among members limit any effective action. However, what is new is that regional alliances are beginning to offer the Middle East an autonomous alternative to Western dependence, showing that security cannot be entrusted to the West, which systematically prioritizes its strategic interests over the lives of the peoples of the region.

The debate over an Arab-Islamic NATO is resurfacing as a political and strategic response to the security vacuum caused by Israel and tolerated by the United States. Its consolidation remains uncertain due to the divisions seen in Doha. It is an attempt to show unity and solidarity in the face of external aggression, symbolically reinforced by pacts such as that between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

As Boris Nad pointed out in 2022, the formation of large blocs remains a global trend, and today it manifests itself in these regional strategic alliances. Although there is still no common military structure, the mere fact that the proposal is being debated after the aggression in Doha confirms that the Middle East is moving towards a logic of regional blocs, albeit fractured by internal rivalries.

Although direct protection of the Palestinians remains limited, the Arab-Islamic NATO could become an independent political and strategic tool, capable of exerting diplomatic pressure, curbing Israeli impunity, and diminishing the influence of a West that has historically shown little interest in ensuring security in the Middle East. In this context, regional alliances are now the most viable option for ensuring stability and defense against external aggression, putting an end to dependence on a West that puts its own interests before the lives and sovereignty of Arab and Muslim peoples.